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Abstract. This track introduction presents the results of the Workshop
on Security practices for Internet of Things, SPIoT held at ETAPS in
Prague in April 2019. For this Special Issue of STTT, we have selected,
invited and edited three distinguished papers. We briefly recall the aims,
summarize the Workshop held in Prague and introduce the selected pa-
pers.
Secure systems are a moving target in the literal sense since they are targeted
by attackers but also for system engineers: they need development methods that
allow for dynamic change to make up for continuously arising new vulnerabilities
of systems previously believed (and maybe even proved) to be secure.
System models need to be concise which is achieved by omission of details;
refinement into concrete systems adds details not present in the abstract model.
Systems may be proved to be secure on the abstract specification and yet attacks
may arise that exploit details added by those refinements. In short, attacks
unforeseen by security proved system specifications come from outside the model.
A real challenge worthwhile to be master-minded is to build a dynamic de-
velopment process that pre-meditates unforeseen vulnerabilities. Such a process
must integrate good engineering practice of co-designing the system together
with the attacker’s possibilities: a process that interleaves secure system design
methods with security risk assessment methods.
Established industry-strength methods for secure system design as well as
security risk assessment exist: for example formal system specification, quanti-
tative model checking and attack tree analysis. Distributed systems based on
the Internet of Things (IoT) seem to allow building more flexible human cen-
tered systems. However, a malicious attacker can easily exploit IoT devices to
build botnets, lock them with ransomware, or use them as a bridgehead into less
accessible networks.
This STTT Special Issue focuses on presenting a few competitive industrial
strength approaches on building holistic yet dynamic secure systems that master-
mind the challenges posed by supporting the formal process for developing secure
IoT systems.
The objective of the SPIoT workshop has been to bring together security
practitioners, security-aware IoT users and formal analysis experts with the aim
of sharing practices and finding guarantees about the trustworthiness of IoT
devices and their use. Relevant case studies came from settings where a security
flaw implies serious damage, such as in industry, safety-critical systems and
healthcare.
Besides presentations of the selected papers below, Jan Kretinsky from TU
Munch presented an invited talk on Expected Cost Analysis of Attack-Defence
Trees.
One of the workshop organizers, Florian Kammüller, presented Security En-
gineering in Isabelle [4] summarizing some of the key findings of the CHIST-ERA
project SUCCESS [7] addressing Security and Privacy in the IoT for healthcare
applications. In this talk, Kammüller showed how to derive formal specifica-
tions of secure IoT systems by a process that uses the risk assessment strategy
of attack trees on infrastructure models. The models of the infrastructure are
logical models in the Isabelle Infrastructure framework [4]. It comprises actors,
policies and a state transition of the dynamic evolution of the system. This log-
ical framework also provides attack trees [2]. The process he proposed in this
talk incrementally uses those two features to refine a system specification until
expected security and privacy properties can be proved. Infrastructures allow
modeling logical as well as physical elements which makes them well suited for
IoT applications. Kammüller illustrates the stepwise application of the proposed
process in the Isabelle Insider framework on the case study of an IoT healthcare
system of the SUCCESS project context [3].
A project partner of the SUCCESS project and another co-organizer of the
Workshop, Marielle Stoelinga, presented a visionary talk on Learning from at-
tacks and failures: generating reliability models from data. In this talk she sum-
marized the lessons learned from previous work [5] on integrating fault tree
analysis with attack trees for quantitative analysis. She sketched the research
landscape and future challenges for formal methods in the presence of machine
learning that are partly addressed in her current work on rare-event simulation
[1].
The other papers presented at the ETAPS Workshop SPIoT on 7. April 2019
in Prague that are published in this Special Issue are briefly introduced below.
They were selected and peer-reviewed after the workshop.
– Static Analysis for Discovering IoT Vulnerabilities (by Pietro Ferrara, Amit
Mandal, Agostino Cortesi, and Fausto Spoto).
The OWASP Top 10 Internet of Things 2018 is a list of security vulnera-
bilities for IoT systems. In this paper, the authors discuss the relationship
between these vulnerabilities and the ones listed by OWASP Top 10 (focused
on Web applications) and how these vulnerabilities can be exploited as well
as how static analysis may prevent them. Furthermore, it is demonstrated
how the industrial analyzer Julia covers a large portion of the OWASP Top
10 vulnerabilities.
– ADTLang: A Programming Language Approach to Attack Defense Trees (by
René Rydhof Hansen, Peter Gjøl Jensen, Kim Larsen, Axel Legay, and Danny
Bøgsted Poulsen)
This paper presents an extension of Attack Defense Trees by temporal depen-
dencies between attacks leading to a specific ordering for successful attacks
and policies for the defender. Moreover, the authors introduce a Domain Spe-
cific Language (DSL) and an accompanying tool based on well-established
tools for formal methods to produce the given results with non-trivial and
automatic translation to and from the target formalisms. The usefulness of
the framework is exhibited on a small running example using the policy
notion to implement a reactive Break The Glass policy.
– Graph-based Technique for Survivability Assessment and Optimization of
IoT Applications (by Vladimir Shakhov and Insoo Koo.)
To make IoT solution more robust against failure or being hacked into, the
authors propose using quantitative methods to provide a means for consid-
ering the trade off between IoT resources and system survivability. The ap-
proach combines specificity of network topology, intrusion details, and prop-
erties of intrusion detection/prevention system. This work combines graph
theory and stochastic process-based models describing the network topol-
ogy as a probabilistic graph. An approach for deduction and computation
of this survivability metric is discussed. Survivability optimization problems
are formulated. In some important practical cases closed-form solutions are
offered.
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